

NIO

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

25 February 1974

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: A Proposal for a National Intelligence Estimate
on Soviet Detente Policy

1. I propose that we undertake an NIE on the bases of Soviet detente policy, its record to date from the Soviet standpoint, and the factors which will determine its future. I have not received a formal request for this estimate. Like others, however, I get numerous questions and professions of confusion and uncertainty on this matter when it comes up in various briefings and discussions. We may not be able to write an estimate that would truly enlighten Secretaries Schlesinger or Kissinger on this score. We can, however, meet the needs of a large number of other officials and, in the process, perhaps define some useful areas of consensus and disagreement.

2. The following prospectus is a reworking of an outline prepared previously by 25X1

3. The Soviet Approach to Detente. A brief presentation of the Soviet conception of detente. An examination of the factors which, in pragmatic terms, make detente an attractive course (and its opposite an unattractive course): the balance of power, the needs of the Soviet economy, the problem of China, the opportunities for Soviet policy with respect to West Europe, Japan, and the US.

4. The costs and risks of detente. The requirement to give up old habits: autarchy, the German bugaboo, automatic and universal opposition to imperialist policies. Reservations about arms control. The sacrifice of North Vietnam. Possible inhibitions on Middle Eastern policy; on crisis behavior generally. Long-run dangers in Eastern Europe. Domestic discipline and the entanglements of domestic and foreign policies, e.g., jamming, emigration. 25X1

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5. Military Policy in the Detente Period. The strategic alternatives as posed in 11-4-73 and 11-8-74. Readiness to pose regional challenges to the US.

6. Detente: The Current Soviet Appraisal. Pluses and minuses of how the Soviet leadership presently evaluates the policy. Any reservations which have developed. Future expectations.

7. Factors Bearing on the Future of Detente. Evolution and perhaps generational change within the Soviet leadership. China and its future attitude toward the USSR. The durability of economic needs and expectations. Future opportunities or dangers in Western Europe. View of the US as a detente partner, including questions about US political leadership. Problems of cohesion and discipline in Eastern Europe and at home.

NIO/USSR

25X1

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Proctor/Walsh/BP/JP

FYI. I have sent info copies to
D/OER, D/OCI, and D/OSR.

Done

File Me

5 March
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

25X1

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